of 'Structural Change for Equality', based upon development policies derived from the school of economic thinking known as neo-structuralism. 2 Specifically, ECLAC has provided a contemporary paradigm in which natural resource income can be thought of as the bridge towards 'knowledge-based' economic development, where a source of 'genuine' productivity (enhancing technical progress) is sought over 'spurious' ones'
(reduction of wages, exchange rate advantages, exploitation of natural resources). In
Ecuador this has been translated into a development program in which resource extraction has to be intensified in the short term in order to support the aims of transitioning to a 'knowledge-based' economy in the longer term. 3 In 2014, the Executive Director of ECLAC, Alicia Barcena, lauded the use of oil revenues to drive public investment, exclaiming that Ecuador has 'taken the bull by the horns and managed to diversify its economy.' 4 This intensification of state-led natural resource exploitation has led some scholars to label state intervention as 'neo-extractivism' that leads to ecological destruction and ultimately the reproduction of the 'resource curse'. 5 In contrast, other scholars see the progressive use of natural resource income as the way in which 'postneoliberal' regimes in Latin America can reduce poverty, improve welfare and chart their own paths within the global economy. 6 Whilst usefully drawing our attention to pressing social and ecological concerns and the politics of resource governance, this literature has had less to say about the relationship between natural resource rents and production. 7 As a result it has not adequately dealt with the form taken by new industrial and technological development initiatives that have emerged in regimes where 'neoextractivism' or 'post-neoliberalism' are said to operate.
To fill this gap this paper draws upon the Marxian critique of political economy to offer a historically grounded and empirically informed rent-theoretical analysis of the policies designed to transform the productive matrix in Ecuador. We make the case that neostructuralism naturalizes both 'natural resources' and 'knowledge' as factors of production, thereby obscuring the social conditions, and global context, under which they enter the production process. The problematic upshot is that the revenues, or rents, from both are seen to exist in isolation, the former rebuked as an unearned gift of nature and the latter celebrated as the product of innovation and entrepreneurship. 8 By demonstrating that rent is not only a distributive category of economic surplus, but also a material relation of production that historically underpins specific and uneven processes of capital accumulation, we can account for the emergence and limits of development strategies in Ecuador that seek to harness 'knowledge' to wealth creation.
We make this argument in reference to the failure of selective import substitution industrialisation (ISI) to expand the domestic scale of capital accumulation and the contradictions of targeting vanguard science and technology development strategies that are materially out of step with the needs and capacity of the domestic economy. The former relies upon the 'intelligent' targeting of state subsidies towards 'knowledgebased' local-value added production, yet this has been led mainly by small industrial capitals with low innovation and productive capacity. Whereas the latter sees 'immaterial' human knowledge as the locus of systematic competitiveness that can be realised through the construction of a new 'City of Knowledge' called Yachay.
Although envisioned as a space of innovation and learning that can tap into Ecuador's main comparative advantage -its bio-diversity, the bid to competitively attract global bio-tech capital points toward the institutionalisation of private property rights around the very 'knowledge' that is identified as the route towards an egalitarian modernity.
The first part of the paper critically situates the developmental reading of natural resource income offered by ECLAC and argues that neostructuralism suffers from an under-theorisation of natural resource rents. In the second part of the paper we explain the Marxian concept of ground-rent through a value-theoretical lens of uneven geographical development in Latin America. Section three draws upon Juan Iñigo Carrera's work on the relationship between ground-rent and capital accumulation in Latin America in order to situate Ecuador's three major primary export booms in historical context. In drawing attention to the role of small industrial capitals, we account for the specifically restricted form of industrial and technological development in Ecuador. Section four puts this approach to work to argue how, and why, the neostructuralist policies designed to transform the productive matrix in Ecuador are reproducing specifically restricted, rent-dependent, forms of capital accumulation. 9 In the conclusion we draw the different strands of the argument together to show how our rent-theoretical critique can illuminate the contradictory relationship between rents, knowledge and production in Ecuador's TPM.
Neostructuralism and the resource curse
Neostructuralism has its intellectual roots in the reforms that ECLAC put in place to accommodate the structuralist tradition to a globalized world. 10 Although too heterogeneous to be called a paradigm, the different strands of neostructuralism have a common objective to re-conceptualize the relations between the state, economy and society, that is to recouple economic growth with social equity and look for pragmatic synergies within globalization that can generate 'systematic competitiveness'. 11 In this context ECLAC has modified the structuralist plan for industrialisation based upon income from natural resources, which, pace the classic texts of Prebisch and Singer, are no longer seen as the cause of deteriorating terms of trade or as a barrier to economic diversification. 12 Rather, natural resource revenues can stimulate 'long term development if they are used for structural change in a way that creates new comparative advantages derived from knowledge-based activities that do not deplete in time and provide growing returns'. 13 'Knowledge-based' activities are repeatedly, and vaguely, cited as those which are intensive in technology and able to stimulate 'Schumpeterian efficiency', in which rents from innovation drive productivity enhancing activities across the economy.
14 For this approach natural resources are neither a curse or a blessing, and nor are they to be viewed in neoliberal terms as being equivalent to any other factor of production within the logic of comparative advantage. 15 Rather, institutions and public policies have a role to play in the productive re-allocation of natural resource income, but in a way that does not repeat the so-called errors of the first attempt at ISI. This conceptualization of structural change on the basis of natural resource income is pitted against the now well established 'resource curse' literature, which correlates abundant natural resources with a variety of social, economic and political ills. 16 However, a closer inspection of the recent ECLAC literature reveals the reproduction of the economic (neoclassical) and governance (public choice theory) tenets of the resource curse theories. 17 For instance, macroeconomic problems such as the appreciation of the exchange rate, the re-allocation of capital to non-tradable sectors and rising costs of capital and labour are un-problematically explained with appeal to the 'Dutch Disease's' analysis of the effects of windfall revenues. 18 As such, the appropriate response according to ECLAC should take the form of macroeconomic policies that modify relative prices in favour of tradable productive activities, but with a real exchange rate that is neither under nor overvalued so as to reflect true 'systematic competitiveness' within a balanced current account. 19 24 Rather than an unconscious underdevelopment of these concepts this can be identified as the result of 'systematic choices', especially when we acknowledge that detaching rent theory from its core in classical political economy was a defining characteristic of neoclassical economics. 25 This type of reading of resource rents in one-sided in so far as it wrenches 'the theory of rent from its counterpart in the labour theory of value', and in doing so it severs the link between the historical development processes (industrial production and natural resource exports) that internally unite the global north and global south. 26 In this vein of critique, the following section offers a Marxian reading of the global relations between rent and production, seen from the perspective of uneven geographical development in Latin America.
Rents, value and uneven geographical development
One of the distinguishing historical features of capitalism is that social labour is carried out in a private and independent form and that the organization of productive activity is achieved through the exchange of commodities. 27 It is through the process of exchange -mediated by competition among producers in a sector -that the socially necessary labour time required to produce a commodity is revealed to individual capitals which, post festum, establishes the normal or average method of production within a sector. As self-expanding value, based upon the exploitation of labour in production, capital will tend to flow to those sectors that offer the highest returns through the formation of the general rate of profit. 28 This results in the uneven development of the productive forces within and across branches of production as capitals struggle to reproduce their social existence under the conditions of competition and the demands to produce below or at the social average in cost terms. 29 This competitive, private and independent process of production is spatially expressed through the dialectic of differentiation and equalization, 30 as the tendential equalization of average rates of profit across different branches of global industry takes concrete form in fragmented national processes of capital accumulation through the international division of labour. 31 The fragmentation of this process in Latin America has been historically marked by territorial subsumption to global capital through the production of agricultural and mining commodities for the world market. 32 Indeed, under capitalism the appropriation of nature occurs for the first time at a world scale and 'to the degree that natural resources are unevenly distributed so a certain kind of uneven geographical development results built around conditions of, say, agricultural productivity or the presence of oil reserves'. 33 This regional insertion of Latin America into the 'classical' international division of labour played a specific role in the development of global industrial capitalism. By cheapening the means of subsistence and reducing the value of labour power in the new industrial centres of the North Atlantic region, the total social capital experienced an increase in both labour productivity and the rate of surplus value production. 34 Yet, in order to gain access to non-renewable natural resources attached to such portions of land under conditions of post-independence private ownership, global capital had to cede a portion of surplus-value to the landlord classes in Latin America.
The resulting income for the landowner 'is known as ground-rent irrespective of whether it is paid for agricultural lands, building land, mines, fisheries or forests'. 35 In this way, although the supply of cheap raw materials increases industrial productivity and the rate of global capital accumulation, the portion of surplus value paid as groundrent represents a deduction from the total social capital accumulated. This renttheoretical perspective can be used to see how the production of both nature and space within the global geography of capitalism 'lies at the heart of uneven development'. 36 For instance, this analysis implies that ground-rent forms part of the market price of primary goods, because in contrast with industrial commodities -whose market price is determined by the average conditions of production within a sector -the price of primary commodities in the world market is determined by the marginal producer, that is, the least fertile lands for which there is solvent demand. 37 As a result, capital that operates on the most favourable and irreproducible lands will experience higher levels of productivity and lower production costs. However, competition among capital to access these lands will increase their rental price which permits the landowner to capture extraordinary profits -capitalized in the land price as a stream of rents. 38 This revenue takes the form of differential rent, based upon the monopoly over differential natural conditions of production. 39 And to the extent that the commodity is consumed overseas -such as oil -the surplus value that forms part of the ground rent comes from the workers and capitals purchasing the commodity in the importing countries.
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This line of argument obviously runs counter to those classic accounts that explain 'the development of underdevelopment' and 'dependency' in Latin America through the identification of the flow of surplus-value in the opposite direction, more recently re-invoked under the name of 'imperialist rent'. 41 We differ from these approaches in that we argue that the process of capitalist development is essentially global in content and national only in its form of realization. 42 This is relevant because it focuses our attention on the fact that the total value that enters into national spheres of accumulation in exchange for the export of primary commodities is greater than their costs of production (including normal profits):
'in connection with differential rent in general, it should be noted that the market value is always above the total production price for the overall quantity produced … This is determination by a market value brought about by competition that produces a false social value.' 43 This means that in their specific determination as a source of cheap raw materials within the uneven development of global capitalism, Latin American countries -although to differing magnitudes -have historically been constituted by inflows of what Marx termed 'false social value' as the material basis for a class of landowners. 44 Of course, these international inflows are not an isolated one-way process as capital has also been re-circulated out of Latin America through interest, profit and rents. For example, Latin
America societies have historically used ground-rent to pay for external public debt borrowed at extraordinarily high interest rates; during ISI foreign capital was attracted to invest in these national spaces to take advantage of fiscal incentives and the chance to valorise obsolete technology in protected internal markets and remit profits abroad; and finally, ground-rent was used to pay for access to foreign technology (although outdated in world market terms) protected by licences and patents which permitted a short, but rapid, phase of capital intensive industrial growth. 45 It is these processes of inflows and outflows of capital that can be used to illuminate the dialectical relationship between ground-rent, production and 'knowledge,' thereby demonstrating how ground-rent forms part of the regional unfolding of uneven geographical development in Latin America.
From this perspective the 'classical' international division was never simply about the polarization of an industrialised 'core' and 'dependent' periphery, the latter restricted to the role of supplier of raw materials and staple foods. 46 Rather, there was a specific process of accumulation whereby industrial capital within the 'periphery,'
although at a reduced scale, was able to valorize through the appropriation of inflows of ground-rent; a process which today also points towards the continuation of elements of the 'classical' within the 'new international division of labour'. 47 As we develop further in the following sections, whereas the former rests firmly on the continued inflows of ground-rent and their transfer to domestic markets, the latter has come about as part of the expanded global production of relative surplus value through new forms of 'knowledge' intensive large scale industry and the geographical separation of the 'mental' and 'manual' along global commodity chains. 48 This calls further attention to the problematic idea that natural resource revenues, given their external origin and the structural constraint they place on the domestic scale of capital accumulation, can be used to pursue national forms of 'systematic competitiveness' based upon 'knowledge' led' industrial upgrading.
The following section employs this perspective to understand the dynamics and effects of the three main historical commodity export booms in Ecuador. This allows us to connect past and present windfalls through a rent-theoretical reading that takes seriously the formation of social classes, firms and technology in relation to specific processes of capital accumulation.
Ecuador and the accumulation of capital through the appropriation of ground rent
Ecuador, where primary commodities have historically made up over 90% of exports, is a paradigmatic expression of the form of uneven development of capitalism outlined above. 49 Inflows of differential ground-rent have been a perennial feature of the development of Ecuadorean capitalism, marked by three phases in particular where a single commodity dominated exports: successively, cacao (1895-1920), banana , and oil (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) . These inflows consolidated the economic power of a financial-commercial-rentier elite composed of a small landlord class, both in their original role as agro-exporters and subsequently through their participation in industrial capital. 50 Although to differing degrees, each phase of resource centred development has been marked by the state's intervention into the inflows of differential rents and their concomitant transfer to the rest of the economy which resulted in the establishment of specific conditions for the circulation and accumulation of capital in the national economy. 51 During both the cacao and banana booms high international prices, the magnitude of exports and inflows of foreign exchange led to the appreciation of the national currency and concomitant import booms. 52 A national currency is overvalued when its capacity to represent social wealth is greater in the domestic than in the world market -i.e. than its real purchasing power. 53 This overvaluation, which is never an automatic effect of windfall but always a state policy, 54 forces exporters to sell foreign exchange earned in global markets below its value, the loss of a fraction of the export price can be sustained because 'a surplus profit -ground rent in the case of primary commodities -must materialized in the price of the exported goods' 55 . Subsequently this foreign currency can be sold below its value to industrial capital for the import of machinery and raw materials, thus indirectly transferring ground rent to the domestic economy. 56 Equally, the state can use targeted imports taxes to recover a portion of the ground-rent from importers benefitting from cheap foreign exchange. Another more direct policy through which the state could divert a portion of the rent away from the landlord's pockets and into the state coffers is export taxes. 57 Levying specific taxes directly on the primary commodity in question allows the state to recover a portion of the ground-rent, but not touching the normal profit of capital, from those agro-exporters participating in the circulation of these commodities to the world market. 58 This mechanism, known as export retention, means that ground rent passes directly into the hands of the state, which can later be transferred to the domestic economy if the state uses this additional social wealth to underwrite subsidies, public lending at negative real interest rates, tax exemption and price controls etc. 59 It is in this way that import substitution strategies are financed, and limited, by the magnitude of ground-rent available for appropriation.
To different extents these policies were observable during both the cacao and banana booms as import and export taxes were used to generate state resources and transfer ground-rent to industrial capital. 60 However during the cacao period such public policies, led by an essentially oligarchic state under the banner of the liberal party, were extremely incipient and ground-rent was either remitted abroad in the form of profits to English and German stockholders or dedicated to the luxury consumption of landed classes with minimal expansion or diversification of the internal market. 61 It was during the banana period when these policies would take a conscious institutional form through an incipient ISI process. Industrialisation initiatives were revamped and intensified in the third period of oil-financed development, when the main appropriator of ground-rent became the Ecuadorean state and the magnitude of differential rents increased dramatically. Indeed, the differentia specifica of oil landlord states derive from the materiality of mineral vis-á-vis agricultural production. As opposed to individual agrarian landowners, whose resource commodity is reproducible and temporally dependent upon each production cycle, mining landowners 'can sit on their natural resources' until the conditions to appropriate a larger mass of ground-rent are more favourable. 65 Therefore, mining landowners, when organised as a class at the world market level in organisations such as the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), will have more bargaining power vis-à-vis industrial capital than agrarian ones, making the rents of oil landlord states relatively larger. This was the fortuitous position that Ecuador found itself when two years after joining OPEC as an oil exporter in 1972, oil prices quadrupled creating a foreign exchange bonanza 'that sustained an average GDP growth rate of 6.3% a year during 1975-80' and crucially positioned the state as the dominant monopoly power over the appropriation and distribution of ground-rent. 66 By 1974 oil income reached 1.16 USD billion (two thirds of income from exports in that year). The state negotiated contracts with oil companies that insured the inflow of new resources to undertake infrastructure programs, the expansion of education and health as well as generous import substitution policies and agricultural modernization. 67 Under tariff protection and generous subsidies to import capital goods, manufacturing production grew by an annual 10% in activities that were intensive in capital and energy and not labour. Unable to compete in the world market, only those capitals that open and close their cycle of valorisation within the national economy can appropriate ground-rent through these mechanisms, effectively sealing off the domestic market. 68 This manifested itself in the further proliferation of small industrial capitals (some within chains of fragments of large international capitals) that only managed to take advantage of the "easy" stage of ISI, that is to say 'substituting the import of basic and non-durable consumer goods without generating higher levels of inter-industrial integration towards the production of intermediate goods. 69 It is for this reason that industrialisation in Ecuador was characterised by obsolete technology, and in today's ECLAC parlance low in knowledge intensity. Therefore, it is here that we can historically locate the relationship between ground-rent, production and 'knowledge'
and highlight that the latter is not simply a factor of production, but a social process historically and institutionally embedded in uneven and differentiated labour processes, firms and forms of technology.
Throughout Ecuador's strongest period of industrial expansion, the dominant classes maintained their power intact both in the watering down of any substantial agrarian reform and increasing their control over incipient manufacturing sectors. 70 Thus rather than the emergence of the industrial bourgeoisie as an autonomous faction of capital, we see the subsumption of industrial manufacturing within the interests of the financial-commercial-rentier elite. 71 The export of non-ground rent bearing commodities (everything except oil, bananas, shrimps and cacao) were negligible for the majority of the oil boom period, as industrial capital valorized in the domestic market on the back of state mediated ground-rent transfers. The jump in public spending was accompanied by a decline in fiscal revenue, provoking deficits in the balance of payments which was covered by debt from foreign banks eager to recycle petrodollars in the late 1970s. 72 As was the case across Latin America, the fall in primary commodity prices and a hike in global interest rates in 1979 pushed Ecuador into a period of crisis and structural adjustment.
From the rent-theoretical perspective developed here it is important to note that when ground-rent ceased to grow at the pace required to compensate for the difference between local and world market levels of productivity, capital accumulation was sustained by: the payment of labour-power below its value; inflows of foreign public debt; exchange rate devaluation; and the selective protection of industrial sectors such as automobiles. 73 During the so-called 'lost decade' of the 1980s, the limited inflow of ground-rent saw the contraction of industry and the downsizing of the state as privatizations were enacted and wages were pushed down under trade liberalization policies. These structural adjustment strategies confined and deepened Ecuador's traditional role as a provider of natural resources throughout the so-called 'long night' of neoliberal structural adjustment. This was the scenario in which the oil sector was opened to foreign investment and the state reduced its participation, giving up 80% of oil royalties to private capital. 74 In which increased annual output by 53 million barrels. 77 Ecuador would also benefit from a period of low interest rates in international capital markets and the favourable renegotiation of foreign debt, meaning the majority of oil revenues were no longer diverted to external liabilities. 78 In addition, when the dollar was undervalued on It is in this structural context that we can locate the 'knowledge-based' policies designed to transform the productive matrix. These can be divided into 'selective ISI strategies' that aim to increase domestic production and 'vanguard' initiatives that take their inspiration from the perceived importance of modern science, research and technology. The former depicts 'knowledge-based' development as the production of material goods with some form of local value-added, whereas the latter is based upon a vision of 'immaterial' human knowledge that can drive future revolutionary industries such as biotechnology. 81 By taking into account the social conditions under which both forms of 'knowledge' enter the production process and their relations with the above outlined dialectic of inflows and outflows of ground-rent, we can unpack the limits and dynamics of the project to 'Transform the Productive Matrix'.
The architects of the transformation of the productive matrix recognise that a dependence upon oil revenue, both in terms of volatile prices and resource depletion (exhaustion of oil reserves by 2030), is unsustainable for a dollarized economy without the capacity to print money or devalue. In 2013 the non-oil trade deficit reached US$9 billion (9.7% GDP) and the overall trade deficit reached USD$1.088 billion which means that, in the main, imports were financed by oil ground-rent. Moreover, dollarization means that Ecuador's de facto national currency is on parity with its capacity to represent social wealth as its purchasing power is the same in domestic and international markets. Along with tending to incentivize imports, 82 and reducing the competitiveness of manufacturing exports, this has eliminated the possibility of using the overvaluation of the exchange rate as the policy mechanism to transfer ground-rent.
In the absence of this mechanism to influence relative prices and therefore competitiveness, the state turned to sectoral policies to support, finance and protect national production. imports through quality control restrictions. 84 At the same time the Ministry and Industries and Productivity (MIPRO) signed firm based agreements with the objective of reducing imports by a value of USD$849 million. 85 In 2014 a reported 679 agreements were signed with 905 companies that generated savings of USD$ 1,726 million and saw a reduction of USD$163 million in the non-oil trade deficit. 86 These import substitution and tariff policies offer a de facto currency devaluation by making imports more expensive and thereby incentivizing domestic production. 87 For example, and electrical goods companies for selective import substitution, to avoid the above outlined pitfalls of traditional blanket ISI strategies. However, in the context of added pressures to safeguard dollarization, it becomes analytically difficult to separate initiatives designed to limit the exit of foreign exchange from those genuinely targeted at productivity enhancing development. For instance, it has been pointed out that the foreign exchange savings of 2013 (USD$ 1.7 billion) were less influenced by import substitution than by the high prices reached by the export of shrimps, bananas and cacao. And with the fall in primary commodity prices that started in mid-2014 extra pressure has been transmitted to the balance of payments, leading to the introduction of further tariff barriers designed solely to protect dollarization. 88 These limits can be seen in another initiative to support the manufacturing of induction ovens. According to the Correa administration, the incentivized transition to new technologically efficient household electric induction cookers will allow the state to remove socially regressive gas subsidies which represent an annual cost of USD$1 billion; renewable energy from new dams will drive down the costs of electricity; and the demand for subsidized induction cookers will create value added industrial manufacturing (under tariff protection). 89 This is a clear example of how ECLCAC´s targeted industrial policies were put to work to transfer natural resource income into quality job creation based upon productivity enhancing and value added sectors. 90 However, despite subsidies of USD $2.4 million to stimulate consumption, the sectoral incentives put in place to stimulate the production of 3.5 million induction ovens by 2016 have only partially been taken up by Ecuadorean white goods manufacturers.
Manufacturers complained of late payment of government subsidises for their inability to raise levels of production, even though they claimed to have the installed capacity to meet all national demand. 91 Nevertheless, in the absence of an increase in national supply, in December 2014 the government removed VAT and tariff barriers to the import of induction cookers with Correa stating 'we don't depend on the will of national producers, if they show they want to do it we will stop the imports...they have failed us in these months'. on 'western science' the state is seen as the arbiter between a 'plurality of forms of property' to ensure the 'highest form of democratisation of the benefits and opportunities of knowledge'. 103 Yet these ideological platitudes for a legislative route to an economy of 'infinite resources' sit ill at ease with the creation of a free trade zone which, according to official promotional documents, seeks to attract global bio-tech capital such as Pfizer and AstraZeneca. As is well known, the very business models of these companies revolve around the extension and enforcement of intellectual property monopolies. 104 In this global industry patents function in the same manner as the above outlined private monopoly over non-reproducible natural resources, by enclosing 'knowledge' the owner can create artificial scarcity and charge a rent for access to the licence, code or genetic material.
Here we can see the paradox at the root of the hope to exploit their monopoly ownership over non-reproducible natural resources (oil and mining) in a way that cross subsidises new bio-technology free from the contradictions of rentier capital accumulation. What this idealized notion of 'knowledge-based' development naively underestimates is the extent to which novel forms of intellectual and scientific labor have come about as part of the global intensification of the production of relative surplus value and the deepening of 'knowledge' and 'technology' as central axes of accumulation'. 105 This has seen global capital relocate production to spaces that offer the optimum combination of cost and productivity, and the fact that this global form of production has come to be associated with the 'knowledge economy' is because, in essence, it is the contemporary mode in which capitalist development is driving (automation-based) technological change. Moreover, when knowledge intensive code, machinery, drugs or genetic material falls under licence and patents they can form a stream of rents for the owner of the monopoly over the intellectual property, blocking the competitive equalisation of profit rates and, therefore, the long term efficiency enhancing impact of Schumpeterian rents. of the social relations' surrounding the control of such powers of production. 107 As a result, strategies to link research and investigation to the actual productive matrix have an extremely embryonic, even incongruous, character; as investment in new Nano and
Bio technologies currently lack a national industrial fabric with any demand for this technology. 108 In this context Villavicencio has pointed out that the Schumpeterian logic of rent capture, in which new innovation drives economy wide efficiency, bears little resemblance to a national economy of small firms that tend to leave and enter the market with similar levels of outdated technology. 
Conclusion
This paper has interrogated the relationship between rents, knowledge and production in Ecuador's state-led project to transform the productive matrix. We showed how an economy historically centred on the extraction of ground-rent is marked by, and embedded within, specific processes of capital accumulation which limit what can be realistically achieved by a state-led turn to a knowledge-based economy. As a result, we argued that 'knowledge' has fallen prey to the same under-theorization as its discursive opposite -'natural resources'. By analytically identifying the social origins of rent, the paper highlighted how the export of natural resources and inflows of differential rents form part of the regional unfolding uneven geographical development in Latin America.
Applying this to the historical development of capitalism in Ecuador we showed how transfers of ground-rent were historically mediated by a combination of state policies
